Law Notes

SEAMOUNTS AND GUYOTS: A
UNIQUE RESOURCE

THE NECESSITY FOR EXPRESS RECOGNITION IN THE FORMULATION
OF AN INTERNATIONAL
I.

REGIME OF THE SEABED

INTRODUCTION

With the availability of natural resources decreasing, and the
population of the earth continuing to increase, nations of the world
are turning to the oceans and seas of the planet as a source of food,
water, minerals, and, in some cases, territory. Until recently, little

attention was paid to national intrusions into the oceans. But as
advances in technology permit greater penetration into and exploitation of the resources of the oceans and seas, it is rapidly becom-

ing clear that a legal regime for the management of the seabed is
vital if the oceans are to supply and replenish the needs of mankind. Attention at first was primarily focused on the Continental
Shelf,1 but recent advances in technology, spurred by the need to

discover new food and energy sources, have effectuated the exploration of the deep seabed, with results indicating that a wealth
of resources exists for the taking. This realization, in turn, has

fostered concern for the establishment of a legal regime for the
1. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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regulation of the ocean floor, the general feeling being that existing
principles of International Law either do not, or cannot, effectively
apply to the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Negotiations have been held in an effort to resolve this dilemma, with yet
another round planned for 1973.2 The 1973 Conference on the Law
of the Sea will attempt the formulization and adoption of an integrated plan, governing most of the submerged lands of the world,
with the ultimate goal of exploitation and development of ocean
resources for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
Past conferences have characterized all submerged lands as seabed; no distinction has been made between geological phenomena,
other than continental shelf and seabed or abyssal depth. There
are, however, a great number of underwater formations which rise
from the sea floor close to the oceans' surface, and which present,
for that reason alone, a factual context entirely different from the
surrounding seabed or continental shelf. These formations, characterized as seamounts or guyots, do not fall within the legal regime
established for land territory, but their physical characteristics require that they be considered independently when formulating any
legal regime for the seabed. This independent consideration is
dictated by the fact that seamounts and guyots may well serve as
the starting point for any large scale utilization of submerged lands,
many of them being already within the range of modern technological capabilities.
The purpose of this paper, then, will be to evaluate the legal
status of seamounts and guyots under current international law
with regard to the possible uses to which these underwater phenomena may be put. Further, an attempt will be made to formulate a legal regime which properly acknowledges the different
physical characteristics of the seabed, with an examination of the
situations which are likely to occur should there be a failure to establish such a regime.

II.

GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Seamounts and guyots are underwater mountains formed by volcanic activity. 3 Seamounts are similar in appearance to land vol2. Two preparatory meetings will be held by the United Nations Seabed Committee during 1973, and the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea will convene April-May, 1974, in Santiago, Chile.

3. Seamounts are basically composed of basalt, an igneous rock which
emerges through the earth's crust as magma and solidifies. For an indepth study of the geological nature of seamounts, see W. MENARD, MARINE
GEOLOGY OF TE PACIFIC (1967), and C. KING, AN INTRODUCTION TO OCENOGRAPHY (1969).
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canoes with a cinder cone and summit crater, but the slopes are
generally steeper, due to the rapid solidification of the lava underwater. 4 Guyots, on the other hand are truncated. 5 It is generally
believed this difference is caused by the fact that seamounts never
reached above sea level, while guyots did protrude above the ocean's
surface at some point during their development. Water and wind
eroded the volcanoes until the summits were levelled, and subsequent settling and shifting of the ocean floor caused them to sink
6
to their present elevation.
Seamounts (which, for convenience, will be used to refer to both
seaanounts and guyots) are classified as such when their elevation
reaches one kilometer or more from the surrounding ocean floor.7
Because they are created by the shifting of the ocean floor, which
in turn causes cracks through which lava can escape to form a volcano, the majority of seamounts are found in the Pacific Ocean, the
world's center of volcanic activity. It is estimated that some 10,000
seamounts exist in the Pacific; over 2000 have already been discovered and mapped," the most famous of which is Bikini. Others
have been discovered in the Indian Ocean, the Carribean, the South
China Sea, and the Gulf of Alaska.9
4. C. KG,supra note 3, at 70-71.
5. Guyots (descriptively called tablemounts) were discovered by Prof.
H.H. Hess during World War II operations in the Pacific. Hess recorded
numerous soundings of the sea bottom and discovered the flattoped mountains which he named after the nineteenth century cartographer Arnold
Guyot. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Seamounts, Keystones to the Earth, OcEANs

(No. 3) (1972) 66 at 67.
6. While this theory has received much support from scientists, see
MENARD and KING, supra note 3, actual proof that guyots were once above
water, and later sank to their present elevations below water was provided by the results of research conducted by Scripps Institute of Oceanography. During exploration in the South Pacific, reef fauna were discovered atop guyots whose peaks rested as far as 1500 meters below the
surface. Rounded and polished cobbles were found as well. Scientists

felt the stones could only have been rounded by surface wave action, the

motion at their present depth being inadequate to polish the stones to that
degree. Further, the presence of the reef coral, which could not have
grown in the colder waters of the greater depths, not below the light
zone-approximately 100 meters-confirmed the hypothesis. LobanovRostovsky, Seamounts, supra note 5, at 67.
7. Dr. H.W. Murray published the first major work on seamounts in
1941. In that work he characterized them as underwater volcanoes with
steep sides, at least one kilometer in height.
8. W. MENARD, supranote 3.
9. W. FRImMAN, THE FUTURE or THE Oc--Ns 12-13 (1971).

Like other volcanoes, seamounts generally occur in chains, along
a rift in the earth's crust. The Hawaiian Ridge is the best example,
and is considered the youngest of the mid-Pacific chains. 10 Other
examples are the Emporer Seamounts, running northward from the
western tip of the Hawaiian chain, and the Marshall and Line Island
chains in the south-central Pacific. There are also two short chains
in the Gulf of Alaska. :"
Seamounts are found at varying depths below the surface, the
depth at which the tops rest depending upon the age of the seamount, and the conditions to which it has been subjected. Several,
however, rise to within several meters of the ocean's surface. Of
those now mapped in the Pacific which are outside the territorial
waters of any nation, seventy rise to within 200 meters of the sur2
face.'
The largest known seamout is located northwest of Midway and
lies 1500 feet below the surface. It is approximately seventy miles
long and forty-five miles wide, rising some 15,000 feet from the
ocean floor.' 3 Other seamounts which have been explored include
the Vema Seamount 14 off the southern coast of Africa, and the
Cobb Seamount, whose summit lies within 122 feet of the surface,
270 miles west of Washington state.
III. POSSIBLE USES
The common characteristic which all seamounts possess and
which makes them of immediate concern and value is their elevation above the sea floor, and their relative proximity to the ocean's
surface. Those which rise very close to the surface may provide
a base for above water operations; while those which rise thousands of feet above the deepest parts of the ocean may be used,
when technology permits, as stepping stones from the surface to
the abyssal depths. It is clear, therefore, that this geological difference between seamounts and the surrounding seabed cannot be
discounted when evaluating the status of the seabed. It is this
characteristic which will be exploited, and upon which most foreseeable uses will depend. The uses are many and varied, and the
following discussion is in no way exhaustive. While many of the
10. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Seamounts, supranote 5, at 67.
11. Id.
12. OcF.

ScmNcE NEws, Vol. 11, No. 18, May 2, 1969.

13. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Seamountz, supra note 5, at 67.
14. See generally Mallory, Exploration of the Vema Seamount, 1966

INT. HYDROGRAaHic REv. 17 (1966).
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suggested utilizations may not be technically feasible at this time,

none is impossible given the present state of technology, and the
nature of research and development currently being conducted.
Proximity of seamounts to the surface will permit the construction of installations which protrude above water, or provide bases
for the construction of artificial islands. 15 These are in existence
today, and as methods are developed for construction in deeper
water, more areas of the high seas will be opened up to these artificial islands and installations. Once established, the uses to which
they may be put are limitless, including the possible construction
and establishment of island nations.' 6 Completely submersible installations have been developed and tested in shallow water, and
once technology permits, there would seem to be no bar to the construction of these installations on the deep seabed. 17 Seamounts
would appear the logical location for such installations, providing
a deep sea environment while avoiding the problems inherent in
descending to the abyssal plain which averages in excess of 5000
meters in depth. Accordingly, evaluation of the possible uses to
which seamounts might be put requires consideration of both above
and below water installations.
15. The subject of artificial islands is on the agenda for the Third Conference, one of the topics on the list prepared by Subcommittee II of the
Seabed Committee. 10 INTL LEGAL MATERIS 1174. See Note, Jurisdictional Problems Created by Artificial Islands, 10 SAN DIEGo L. Rsv. 638
(1973).

Creation of a new island nation has already been attempted in the
South Pacific on the Minerva Reefs. An island was constructed by a private firm, and a sovereign state declared, after which the "nation!' intended to solicit the registration of vessels under its colors. OcEAN SciENCE NEWS, April 7,1972, at 2-3.
16. Although there have been attempts made, no "nations" have been
completely successful, and there is some question as to whether they

would be legal under current international law. See Section IV, infra.
17. Cousteau and Piccard are two oceanographers responsible for the
development of many of the submersibles and diving techniques currently
utilized for exploration of the deep sea. The American Sea Lab experiment placed men in underwater habitats for forty-five days. Cousteau
equipped an underwater station with divers and equipment, and conducted diving experiments from there for 23 days. The Soviets have also
experimented with underwater living, having conducted 'extended operations in the Black Sea. W. FRnmAx, supra note 9, at 24-25. Given the
fact that all of these major technological achievements have occurred
within the last fifteen years, there would seem no reason to doubt the existence of such underwater installations within the near future.

A.

Research

Perhaps before any practical use will be made of seamounts, the
scientific research which will make such use and exploitation possible will move from land and ship based operations to installations
located in or on the high seas. Manned installations on the open
seas, unaffected by winds and current, would permit more detailed
studies than do research vessels which have limited range and
maintenance capabilities. Underwater installations would permit
the study of every, facet of the marine environment, including
sea life, currents, and the seamounts and seabed as well. 18 Experimentation on such stations on a small scale will help scientists
determine which of the anticipated utilization programs of the sea
will be feasible, both technically and economically, thus helping to
guide the progress of the exploitation of the oceans' resources.
B. Military Utilization
A most obvious use of seamount installations would be for the
establishment of military bases of varied nature.1 9 Missile sites,
both offensive and defensive, could be located on above and below
surface structures, affording greater protection to the establishing
nation, and providing, presumably, a greater deterrent to bellicose
nations. Unmanned missile installations could be operated at
depths greater than those at which manned submersibles can currently operate efficiently, at the same time affording a greater degree of protection against enemy detection and destruction. Radar
stations above and below the surface could provide a nation with a
highly effective warning system, providing that nation a more ex18. Lobanov-Rostovsky presents and develops the hypothesis, already
accepted by many, that seamounts hold the key to the theory of "moving
plates" on the ocean floor, which, in turn, is the basis of the concept of
"continental drift;" supra note 5, at 66-68.

19. See Gehrig, Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the Seabed, 54

Mm. L. REv. 168 (1971); W. FRmwiMAN, supra note 9, at Chapter 5. Quasimilitary utilization, other than ordinary naval operations, has already
been made of some parts of the seabed. The hydrogen bomb experimentation at Bikini may have sparked much of the controversy over possible
military use of the seabed. In that context, see Margolis, The -ydrogen
Bomb and International Law, 64 YAL.E L.J. 629 (1955). Those experiments, and the continued escalation of the arms race may also have been
partly responsible for the treaty recently signed by the United States and
others, prohibiting the emplacement of missiles and other weapons on the
sea floor; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, done at Washington, London and Moscow, February 11, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, G.A./4355 Annex to G.A. Res.
2660 (XXV), 10 INT'L LEGAL _ATERu.s 145 (1971). For the applicability
of current international law and treaties to seamounts, see Section IV, infra.
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peditious alert than would a costal or land-locked system. 20 Functions related to the employment of submarine warfare would be
more effectively conducted from undersea bases, by extending the
range of the underwater vessels, and making them independent of
surface supply and maintenance facilities. A network of such installations located outside the territorial waters of a nation at accessible depths would permit worldwide support of submarine
fleets, while maintaining the secrecy considered essential to the
effective employment of submarines.
C. Mineral Resource Development
Perhaps the most important use of seamounts and guyots will
be connected with the exploration of the seabed for mineral resources. The nations of the world are turning to the sea as a
source for many vital minerals which are becoming less available
on the land masses, and are known to be in great abundance on
and under the seabed. 21 Although technological limitations pres20. For a view that warning systems are not desirable, but that the

anti-missile system is the better system to employ, see Brennan, The Case
for Missile Defense, FormGN AFFAms, April, 1969.
21. Manganese nodules are the principal and most abundant form of
seabed surface deposit, and present the richest source of undersea wealth
other than petroleum deposits which are not known to be present under
the high sea bed. In a memorandum delivered to the First Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly, Ambassador Pardo of Malta stated
that the manganese nodules of the entire seabed contain the following
minerals:
43 billion tons of aluminum-20,000 years reserve as compared to land
reserves of 100 years at 1960 consumption rates;
358 billion tons of manganese-400,000 year reserve compared to land
reserves of 100 years;

7.9 billion tons of copper-600 year reserve as compared to land reserves of 40 years;

1 billion tons of zirconium-100,000 year reserve as compared to land
reserves of 100 years;

14.7 billion tons of nickel-150,000 year reserve as compared to land

reserves of 100 years;
5.2 billion tons of cobalt-200,000 year reserve as compared to land
reserves of 40 years;
further, the Pacific Ocean alone contains 207 billion tons of iron, 10 billion
tons of titanium, 25 billion tons of magnesium, 1.3 billion tons of lead,
800,000 tons of vanadium, and others. Reproduced in W. FRIEDmAN, supra
note 9, at 21. But see, Leigh Ratiner, supplemental statement before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, March 1, 1973, for a more recent appraisal of the expected short-term gains from manganese nodule exploitation.

ently exist, it is only a matter of time before full scale commercial
exploitation of the minerals of the seabed, and seamounts and
guyots themselves, proceeds. Seamounts can serve as bases for underwater mining operations, by providing support for drilling platforms, temporary storage facilities, or even processing stations for
retrieved materials. While there is no indication that seamounts
are a source of hydrocarbons, they are believed to contain hard
mineral deposits;2-2 and, in any event, they could be instrumental
in the extraction of any deep sea petroleum deposits. Manganese
nodules, abundant in the deep sea, are present on the flat topped
guyots, and hence more readily accessible than nodule deposits on
23
the abyssal plain.
D.

Transportation

In connection with plans for the exploitation of oceanic minerals, many writers foresee the use of underwater barges rather than
surface craft for the transportation of these and other cargoes. 24
Underwater cargo vessels would avoid the problems of wind, tide,
and wave action, and afford a greater degree of safety from detection or destruction by an enemy power. Barges could pick up and
deliver cargoes at undersea collection points, for delivery to other
undersea ports or surface destinations. Final delivery could be
22.

W. FaImEmAN, supra note 9, at 10-11.

23. Commercial exploitation of manganese nodules is currently underway on a limited scale. A Japanese firm has developed a continuous
bucket line system for nodule retrieval at depths of up to 12,000 feet.
Deep Sea Ventures, an American enterprise associated with a West German firm, plans to operate a 1 million ton nodule processing plant by the
mid 1970's, the nodules to be retrieved from the Pacific between the
United States and Hawaii. Hughes Tool Company has developed a vessel
to operate in 10,000 feet of water, due to be operational later this year.
Auburn, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, 9 SAN DiEao L.
REV. 491 (1972). Other nations including France and the Soviet Union
are involved in expeditions to find valuable mining areas, and in the development of mining techniques.
A strong argument against the concept of profitable extraction of seabed mineral resources is made by Schaefer, The Resources of the Seabed

and Prospective Rates of Development as a Basis of Planning for International Management in THE LAw OF THE SEA: THE UNrr=a NATioNs AND
MANAGEMNT 71 (Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference on
the Law of the Sea Institute, 1970). In that speech Mr. Schaefer indicates that the seabed will not provide a large portion of the world's hard

OcExA

mineral resources within the foreseeable future, and that the importance of

these deposits is being overrated. Furthermore, he believes that the
minerals which can be found in the high seabed are also available near

shore, so there need be no problems with national incursions into the seabed beyond national jurisdictions.
24. E.g., see Johnston, Law, Technology and the Sea, 55 CAL. L. Rur.
449, 452 (1967); W. FRImMAN, supra note 9, at 54-55.
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made by using either smaller submersibles, or surface craft, which
would take on the cargoes unloaded from the underwater barges,
and deliver them to any type of coastal port or facility. The logistics of underwater transfer of cargo have not as yet been determined, but an appropriate delivery method will be developed with

the advent of the undersea barges. Any commercial system utilizing these underwater transports will be faced with the same operational requirements as our military submarine fleets; ports and
bases to service, load and unload, and resupply the craft without
the necessity of surfacing. Such bases could be conveniently located on seamounts, particularly if mining or drilling operations
were situated nearby. The barges could shuttle retrieved minerals,
processed or raw, to land based plants for final processing, resupplying marine installations on return voyages.
Super-tankers, those already operational, as well as those currently planned, because of their immense size may also be forced to
rely on ports located in the open sea, some distance from the ports
and harbors of their destination state.25 Seamounts relatively close
to shore would make ideal locations for installations to load and
unload petroleum products, which could be piped to the mainland,
and other cargoes, which could be loaded onto barges when brought
to or from offshore freighter ports. All this could be conveniently
handled without the risk of the giant tankers and freighters approaching shallow waters.
E. Fishing

Next to transportation, the fishing industry makes the greatest
commercial use of ocean resources at the present time, and it, too,
25. An Almanac of Tanker Ships, OCEANS (No. 3) (1972) at 36-37 dis-

cusses the new supertankers, including those which draw 80 feet, and some
planned with drafts considerably larger. These tankers do not as yet call
at U.S. ports, as the channels of the deeper eastern ports average 60 feet.
These tankers will call at U.S. ports in the foreseeable future, however,

and the article's prediction-offshore terminal facilities. See also FoR=n, Feb. 1973, at 95. A report there discusses the world's largest drydock facility at Lusnave, Portugal.

That shipyard recently completed

construction of a 1 million ton drydock facility, the mere existence of
which, experts feel, will encourage the building of bigger ships. Of
course the environmental fears may slow down the development of these
giants, but once sophisticated methods are developed for preventing or

controlling marine pollution problems presented by these larger ships,
necessity will dictate the construction of the larger, more economical ships.

responds to changes in technology. 26 As many of the traditional
fishing grounds are suffering from over-exploitation, the fishing
industry may have to turn to other areas of the high seas for survival. It is logical to assume that high sea installations on seamounts could play an important part in the revitalization of the

fishing industry.2 7 Bases located far from home ports would be
more accessible to national fishing fleets, permitting extended operations, and providing needed support. Processing plants located
at these sites would permit the immediate processing of the catch,
and the freshly cleaned fish could then be shipped directly to the

consumer nations, rather than indirectly through the ports of the

fishing nation."
To use installations in this way, however, might be more detri-

mental to the fishing industry than it would be helpful. The capacity of a fishing fleet would be multiplied, and the exploitation
would only be that much more harmful. Perhaps seamount installations could be used as research sites for the fishing industry,
studying ways to foster the growth of marine life, developing large
scale stocking operations, and conducting conservation and control
programs. In this sense, seamount bases would be performing a
most valuable service to the industry.
F.

Communications
Communication stations, both civilian and military, might well

26. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N.
(FAO), world production of fish totalled 64 million metric tons in 1968,
and reflected an average growth rate of 25% per decade. Further, it is
estimated that the demand for fish in 1985 will be 65% to 100% greater than
the demand in 1965. Jacobson, Bridging the Gap to International Fisheries
Agreement: A Guide for Unilateral Action, 9 SAx Dmao L. REv. 454, 460
(1972).
27. It is of interest to note that schools of tuna congregate over seamounts in the open sea. This is due to the presence of seamounts in the
path of undersea currents. The seamounts divert the currents toward the
surface, carrying microorganisms from the bottom, which foster the growth
of plankton. The plankton attract smaller fish on which the tuna feed.
28. Factory ships permitting the handling of greater quantities of fish
by the fleets, while retaining mobility, are currently part of the Soviet,
Japanese, and Norwegian fleets. While these ships are partly to blame
for the exploitation of certain prime areas, perhaps the economics involved in maintaining these vessels is a cause of the problem. While
fixed installations would certainly have greater operating expenses, at
least in the short run, and would lack the mobility which these ships
possess, if their utilization as research and conservation control stations
were coupled with a part in a scientifically controlled fishing industry,
some of these problems might be alleviated. Overexploitation will also
be controlled to a degree with adoption of a now highly desirable international fishing agreement. See Jacobson, supra note 26.
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be positioned on seamounts, both to aid in the navigation of sur-

face and subsurface vessels, and to provide a link in the global
communications scheme made possible by the orbital satellites.
The U.S. Coast Guard currently operates LORAN 29 stations, built
on atolls or small islands, but much of the ocean area is not covered to the extent which might be considered desirable. Use of seamounts would permit the completion of a network of these stations,
thus reducing the chance of vessel loss, and increasing the possibility of recovery in case of accident by permitting accurate and
continuous monitoring of vessel location.
G. Weather Forecastingand Control
Installations constructed on the high seas, away from the influence of the land masses, could be beneficially employed in weather
forecasting. Permanent sites would afford a greater degree of
safety than surface craft, while facilitating the evaluation and
analysis of weather phenomena created over the oceans. When,
and if, weather control becomes a reality, these installations on the
high seas, where scientists believe much of our weather originates
through air-water interaction, would permit the harnessing of otherwise harmful conditions before population centers and agricultural lands were affected. Similarly, such establishments would
be the logical place for the "creation" of desired weather conditions.
H. Expansion of Territory
While mention has already been made of the availability of seamounts as bases upon which to build artificial islands, such islands
might serve more than a purely economic purpose. The landlocked nations of the world have a great interest in the sea, 3 0 and
their inaccessibility to coasts and ports may be a contributing factor
as to why the majority of them are underdeveloped. Seamounts
29. Long Range Aid to Navigation.
30. See The Study of the Question of Free Access to the Sea of LandLocked Countries and of the Special Problems of Land-Locked Countries
Relating to the Exploration and Exploitation of the Resources of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
A/AC.138/37 (1971); and Note, The Interest of Land-Locked States in Law
of the Sea, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1972).

may offer opportunities to the land-locked nations, possibly permitting the extension of sovereignty through the construction and
maintenance of facilities on the high seas. The effect would be to
make available to these states the benefits which come from participation in world trade through one's own ports.
This narrative is far from complete, and there are many uses to

which these undersea mountains might be put which are related to
those previously mentioned. Underwater agriculture or "aquaculture" is currently being investigated as part of the search for new
sources of food.3 1 Should research determine that food can be
raised under controlled conditions and economically harvested from
the sea, unpolluted areas will be sought out and utilized. Seamounts might present an opportunity for aquaculture, in that they
are abandant in the high sea, many parts of which are relatively
unpolluted by the advance of technology. The concept of using the
ocean for the creation of recreational communities and parks has
received much attention, and plans are underway for the construction of both above water and undersea resort hotels. While much
of the construction is planned for reefs and archipelagoes, seamounts lying relatively close to shore, such as are prevalent in the
Pacific, would be equally suitable.
IV. Tm LEGAL STATUS OF

SEAMOUNTS

There have been no specific references to seamounts and guyots
in the international agreements on law of the seas to date. The
primary reason for the absence of such considerations can be safely
assumed to be a general failure to recognize these geological phenomena as distinct from the seabed in general. Some excuse for
the oversight exists for the early discussions and perhaps even for
the Geneva Conventions of 1958. At that time technology which
would allow for productive exploration of most of the seabed was
unavailable; however, such technology was foreseeable. 32 Even so,
the extent of foresight as to the possibilities of exploitation must
have had its limits. By 1967, there should have been greater aware31. Fish farming has been suggested as a method of replenishing the

over-exploited prime fishing areas. Kelp production off the California
coast is another facet of ocean agriculture, the 1971 harvest yielding
160,000 tons. Oyster farming, long practiced in the waters of Japan is
another example of a practical use of the sea, and may have contributed
to the decision made by the Public Health Service to designate 10 million
acres of seabed as suitable for raising shellfish. W. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 9, at 110. See Galton, Aquaculture is More Than A Dream, N.Y.
TiMs MAGAznw, June 10, 1967, at 13.
32. D. Bowing,THE LAw ors
SrA at 33 (1967).
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ness and some serious discussion as to the special problems looming
in the near future. 3 Technological and scientific progress by that
year had made it clearly predictable that the seabed would be a
source of riches, and that seamounts could provide necessary access to otherwise virtually inaccessible depths. Nevertheless, the
significance of seamounts has remained unacknowledged by most
commentators, and the existing legal status of these structures
must be presumed to be the same as that of the seabed itself.14
Provisions pertaining to the present status of the seabed, for purposes relevant here, are primarily encompassed in three of the
1958 Geneva Conventions: the Convention on the Territorial Sea

and the Contiguous Zone,35 the Convention on the High Seas,
37

6

and

the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
As this article is limited to seamounts located outside the exclusive jurisdiction of any

nation, the second convention should give the most substance to
the law involved, but in fact it contributes little by itself. What
law there is on the high seabed must be deduced from the provisions of all three conventions and other outside material.
A. The Convention on the TerritorialSea and The Contiguous Zone
Two important definitions provided in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone are those of "islands"3 8 and
"low tide elevations."3 9 As islands must be above water at high
33. After the 1958 Conventions, the United Nations had little to do
with the sea. Serious discussion in the General Assembly began again
in 1967 with G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII) (1967), 7 IN'L. LEGAL MrAL..s 174
(1968).
34. The problems with the continual failure to distinguish seamounts
from the seabed in general are pointed out infra, FALURE To AGREE, Section VII.
35. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
at Geneva, April 29, 1958 [1964], 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
36. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
37. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 1.
38. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 35, Sec. 11, Art. 10:
1. "An island is a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide."
2. "The territorial sea of an island is measured in accordance with
the provisions of these articles."
39. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra

tide, seamounts cannot be so categorized, but those near the surface might belong to the latter class. It is not clear whether these
40
low tide elevations are subject to claims of national sovereignty.
The importance of this classification is that low tide elevations have
no territorial waters.41 In light of recent technology, particularly
-the fact that seamounts and guyots could be developed into islands, the denial of territorial waters is potential grounds for dispute. Also, the possibility of an underwater dormant volcano
erupting and becoming an island presents an issue as to the concept of "territory". 42 For example, a seamount which is classified
as part of the seabed, located on the high seas, would be subject to
no territorical claim of sovereignty. If volcanic action caused the
mount to "rise" so that it remained above water at high tide, thus
qualifying as an island, a question arises as to whether territorial
claims might be made. 43 Such a nonstatic concept of territory
might wreak havoc in any international regime which attempts
to formulate broad rules without consideration of the various structural phenomena of the ocean floor.
B. The Convention on the High Seas
Perhaps the most applicable provision in this treaty, in terms of
note 35, Sec. II, Art. 11:
1. "A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of land which
is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at
high tide. ..."
2. "Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an
island, it has no territorial sea of its own."
40. The United States contends that they are not, while some other
countries contend that they are, subject to national jurisdiction. This dispute came to a head in connection with the Guano Islands and low tide
elevations which the United States relinquished to Colombia and Honduras recently.
41. See note 39 supra. However, installations and structures built upon
low-tide elevations would probably be entitled to a 500 meter safety zone
under Art. 5 of the Shelf Convention, if they were used for the purpose of
exploiting the natural resources of the area, and if one can infer that the
rules applicable to the shelf in this respect would also pertain to the
high seas.
42. That such a possibility exists can be concluded from a history of
the growth of the Hawaiian Island chain. See Craven, United States Options in the Event of Nonagreement, in Tim LAw OF THE SEA: THE CONSEQUENCES

OF

FAILURE TO AGREE

46 (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual

Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1971). See also, Matthews,
This Changing Earth, NAT'L GEoGRU'mc (Vol. 153, No. 1) (Jan. 1973) at 1,
about the island of Surtsey which "burst from the Atlantic" in 1963.
43. It should not be inferred from this question that seamounts below
the surface of the water are not also possibly subject to something similar to a territorial claim. See Traditional International Law., infra Subsection D.
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assigning some existing law to the seabed beyond the continental
shelf, is Article 1. "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters
of a state. '44 (Emphasis added) This may imply that "all parts",
includes the seabed, although there is no indication of an intention
4
to include it.

5

Article 2 provides for the high seas to be open to all nations:
..

. no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to

its sovereignty." Assuming that the seabed is included as part of
the high seas, then it also would be incapable of occupation by any
47
state, 40 and open to the same freedoms as the sea above it.

C.

48

These
Colombos believes this to be the better interpretation.
freedoms, coupled with the added condition of "reasonable regard
to the interests of other states, '49 could play an important role in
restricting the exploitation of seamounts as long as nations con44. Convention on the High Seas, supranote 36.
45. "There is no implication that 'all parts' of the high seas includes
the seabed; in fact, the situation is just the opposite. The International
Law Commission's commentary to the draft article which became Article
1 of the Convention on the High Seas states:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom
to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that
(apart from the continental shelf) . . .such exploitation had not yet

assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regula-

tion.
Although Brazil submitted a proposal which would have substituted 'wa-

ters of the high seas' for 'high seas,' the stated purpose being to avoid
confusing the seabed with the superjacent waters and establishing a
legal regime for the high seas, which proposal was rejected, it seems unquestionably clear that the 1958 conferees did not regard any of their
work as being applicable to the seabed, except insofar as cables or pipelines might rest there as a result of that enumerated freedom."

Professor

H. Gary Knight, in a letter dated March 29, 1973.
46. C. COLOMCBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA at § 81 (1967).
47. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, Art. 2.
"These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas."
48. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 46, at § 81.

This view has been rejected by

most other commentators, e.g., see Creamer, Title to the Deep Seabed:
Prospects for the Future, 9 HARv. INT'L L.J. 205 (1968). Cf. Professor H.
Gary Knight believes that the Convention on the High Seas is inapplicable
to the seabed, and that the area should be considered res nullius because
it is not subject to any jurisdiction at the present time and international
law has always regarded unappropriated territory as res nullius.
49. See note 47 supra.

tinue to recognize these structures as part of the high seas covered
by the Conventions. When it becomes advantageous to consider
them as unique, however, the problem of undefined and unspecific
law in regard to seamounts will arise to haunt the shortsighted.
Article 3 of the treaty, recommending free access to the sea for
land-locked states is noteworthy here, but not in the context of
"access" as ingress and egress.5" Rather, the provision for these
countries is important as evidencing international agreement that
the high seas should be open to all nations, including those with no
coast.51 The developmet of a seamount into a port-type complex
on the high seas might possibly afford a land-locked nation a coast
52
away from home.
Since weather stations, communication centers and transportation facilities are among the proposed uses of seamounts and guyots, Articles 24-26 of the Convention on the High Seas appear to be
notably significant. Specifically, these provisions govern the duties of nations in regard to pollution, radiation and cables. Foreseeably, some of these propositions would require the utilization of
apparatus which comes under the purview of the Convention. Furthermore, nuclear energy has already proven itself a valuable tool
in the conquest of the ocean. No doubt its usefulness will again
be demonstrated when seamount installations become a reality.
These installations, to some degree, must emit pollutants; depending upon the circumstances these provisions will be applicable. In
fact, the Convention on the High Seas may, in this context, prove
a more powerful regulatory instrument than appearances would
lead one to believe.
C.

The Convention on the ContinentalShelf

A major problem left unresolved by the 1958 treaties is the
width of territorial waters and the continental shelf. The primary criterion for the shelf is that it be "adjacent" to a state's territorial waters. 53 As no definite limit has been determined for ter50. The term "recommending" is used here because of the wording of
the treaty.
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with
coastal States, States having no sea coast should have free access to
the sea. (Emphasis added).
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, Art. 3. See generally, note
30 supra.
51. Further evidence that the land-locked states are to share in the
development of the high seas appears in the discussions surrounding the
preparations for the 1973 Conference. See PRoPosALs, Sec. V. infra.
52. W. FmxA
nMA_,
supranote 9, at 46.
53. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 1, Art. 1:
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ritorial waters, the extension of the continental shelf is necessarily
indeterminable as to its landward boundary, although the indeterminability of the landward boundary is unimporant in regards
to the discussion here, since a coastal state would have a presumptive claim to any seamounts or guyots within its territorial sea.
The seaward boundary is even more nebulous--'.., to a depth of
200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas; .

. .

."54 Obviously, the designation of the 200 meter

qualification presents few interpretational difficulties, but both
criteria have been made meaningless in light of rapid technological progress. 55 There are other problems involved with the
current limitations. While the meaning of adjacency is clear,
it is not clear whether "legal adjacency" is "broken" by a deep
trench, not susceptible to exploitation, although the coastal state
is capable of exploiting the entire surrounding area. The ability
to exploit is present, but the legality of using a natural bridge
to cross such a trench, or merely ignoring the fact that there
is a break in the area of possible exploitability (and hence in "legal
adjacency") is undetermined. A related line of inquiry deals with
the meaning and import of the term "exploitation." There is no
distinction made between exploitation of a natural non-removable
resource 6 (a seamount, for instance) and removable resources;
nor is it clear exactly what kind and degree of activity is required
to constitute exploitation.
It appears that the members of the 1958 Conventions had only
mineral resource extraction in mind as the probable use of the seabed; had they foreseen other possibilities, more specific law on the
57
use of the seabed would have been in order.
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf' is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas: ...

54. Id.
55. W. FaRnmAm, supra note 9, at 37.
56. In United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970) the court held
that building on a coral reef was considered to be building on "natural re-

sources" within the meaning of the Shelf Convention. See, Recent Case,
6 SAN DIEGo L. Ray. 487 (1969).

57. See generally, Study prepared by the Secretary of the United Na-

By Article 2 coastal states are given sovereign and exclusive
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources, which rights are not dependent upon occupation or express proclamation. A literal interpretation of the grant of sovereignty, coupled with merely the exploitability limit, leads to the
incredible conclusion that the entire seabed is potentially susceptible to claims of exclusive rights to explore and exploit. The problem of breaks in "legal adjacency" remains, but with advancing
technology this obstacle could be overcome. 58 Since the seabed
would merely have to be "exploitable" and not necessarily exploited, seamounts and guyots distant from a coastal state could be
exploited and claimed on the theory that the area in-between is
exploitable.59
The fact that the high seas are partly defined as that which remains after territorial claims, and the provision in Article 3 excepting the superjacent waters of and airspace over the high seas
from the provisions on the continental shelf, make it clear that national claims could encroach into what otherwise would be the high
seas. This concept follows the pattern set by the Truman Proclamation of 1945,60 which claimed for the United States the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf around
the United States. The extent of the claim is not precisely defined,
but is estimated to extend up to 250 miles from the coast over the
61
high seas in some areas.
The limits on possible exploitation and uses of seamounts may
be inferred from Article 5, emphasizing the freedom of navigation
on the high seas, protection against pollution, and preservation of
traditional fishing rights. For example, no installations could be
built upon seamounts so as to impede international navigation.
tions for the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 135/19, 13-18, 24-26, 28-34; and Oxman, The Preparationof Article 1
of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 3 J. oF MAIumnVm LAW AND
CovnvmRcE 245, 445, 683 (3 parts, 1972).
58. The United States has "explored" the deepest spot in the oceansthe Marianas Trench at the Challenger Deep, 35,760 ft.; and in 1960, the
U.S. descended to 35,802 ft. in an area 36,198 ft. deep.
59. However, see Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62
Am. J. INhT'L L. 641, 644 (1968): "While 'adjacency' is not specifically
defined, it undoubtedly conveys a notion of limitation which cannot be
reconciled with indefinite extension into the great oceans."
60. Proclamation No. 2667, "Policy of the United States With Respect to
the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental
Shelf," Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).

61. C. CoLoMBos, supra note 46, at § 86. A State Department announcement accompanied the proclamation and defined the extent as 600 feet.
13 DEPT ST. BuLL,. 484 (1945).
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Perhaps a port or a processing installation which would attract additional traffic would have such an effect. Nor could a use be
made of a seamount which might destroy existing fishing grounds
in the area, such as a use causing increased activity in the vicinity
which would drive the fish away or disrupt reproduction patterns.
Likewise, an island built upon a seamount for recreational or industrial purposes would come under international law in regards to
dumping its waste materials and/or radioactive pollutants. 62
Since the breadth of territorial waters has not been uniformly
set, and since the continental shelf seems potentially boundless, it
is important to recognize the uniqueness of seamounts and buyots
-unique in that their relatively shallow depths make them foreseeably accessible and exploitable in the near future. Nevertheless,
the conclusion must be drawn that the 1958 Conventions would
permit a sovereign claim to the use of seamounts and guyots in the
high seas, either by an outright extension of territorial waters,63
or by an extension of the continental shelf. 64
D. TraditionalInternationalLaw
Traditional international law outside the 1958 Conventions is also
applicable to the legal status (or potential legal status) of seamounts and guyots. A claim of sovereignty, or territorial authority,
is generally associated with occupation. Most commentators have
rejected Mr. Colombos' view that the seabed is subject to the
same rules as the high seas and thus unclaimable6 5 The historic
reservation to the acceptance of the notion of claiming the seabed
is based upon the physical incapability to occupy and exploit. Some
authorities believe that exploitation without occupation may be
sufficient to stake a legal claim to part of the seabed. 66 Mr.
Creamer contends that the "adjacency" requirement for claiming
sovereignty over the continental shelf does not pertain to territory
62. See Newton, Seabed Resources: the Problems of Adolescence, 8 SAN

DIEGo L. REv. 551, 557 (1971).
63. Such an extension would, of course, actually eliminate the legal
concept of high seas and would in all probability fail to gain recognition
from the international community.
64. See Young, supra note 59.

65. E.g., Creamer, supra note 48.
66. Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 43
(1923).

in the high seas since the need for coastal security does not apply
there. 67 Furthermore, he contends that technological advances necessitate the recognition of claims based upon national occupation.
"Placement of manned installations and extraction of minerals
should certainly constitute effective occupation of an undersea
area.168 Sir H. Waldock, in agreement, states that activity which
would, in effect, meet the requirements of adverse possession or
prescription (that is, open, notorious claim and use) should be sufficient for purposes of occupation. 9 Whereas an island in the high
seas could actually be subject to a territorial claim, a seamount or

guyot, being a part of the seabed, could be claimed only for ex-

clusive rights to explore and exploit natural resources.7° The significance of this limitation in most instances is very little in light
of the expressly limited holding in United States v. Ray which may
have implied -that building upon a submarine structure is equivalent to exploiting natural resources.71 In other words, almost every possible use of a seamount could amount to an exploitation of
natural resources, at least as far as the United States courts are
concerned. Just what degree of occupation would be required to
constitute a valid claim is still undetermined (a problem hopefully
to be avoided by the establishment of an international regime for
the seabed). One facet of the question which, until recently, was
considered to be a barrier to any effective claim of the seabed is
the delineation of a narrow enough area to be recognized (which
may be called the problem of "fencing-in"). With modern technological advances, the ascertainment of definite claims is quite
feasible, especially in the case of seamounts. "It is perhaps not
hard to say that a particular seamount, limited in area and with a
well-defined perimeter, can become 'occupied' when a manned station is built upon it, or even when an unmanned installation is
placed there."7 2 The real limitations on making such claims on the
high seas are the freedoms of navigation and fishing expressed in
the Conventions and reflected in traditional law of the seas. Mr.
67. Creamer, supranote 48, at 215.
68. Id. at 216.

69. Waldock, Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf, 36
TRANSAC. GRoT. Soc'y. 115, 142 (1950), reported in Creamer, supra note 48.
70. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, Arts. 1 and 26.
71. 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970). The limited holding of the case dealt
with building upon a coral reef, but it is safe to infer that the United
States would resist any attempts to build upon any submarine structures
where the effect might impede its territorial security.
72. Young, supra note 59, at 646. It is interesting to note that while
Young recognized the potential for seamount development, he completely
passed over and failed to recognize the same as a source of potential
conflict.
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Creamer does not believe that these requirements would hinder
high seas development as long as claims of right are not unrea73
sonably large.
Determinations of "reasonableness" in regard to the use to which
the seabed is being placed, in consideration of the burden being
imposed upon the rest of the international community and the
physical extent of the area involved, are supposed prerequisites to
a legal use of any part of the high seas under a conglomeration of
existing international law.7 4 In practice, however, some of the history of the use of the high seas appears to reflect the theme of
"might makes right." Specifically, the use of the ocean by the
United States and France as a testing ground for nuclear weapons
has been criticized as having violated the basic rules of freedom of
the high seas.7 5 If such action is a preview of what is in store for
international law when exploitation becomes profitable, then perhaps that theme sums up the legal status of the seabed, seamounts
and guyots included. Significantly, declarations by the United

States in recent months give signs that such pessimism is unwar7
ranted. 6

Further existing law along the line of military uses for the seabed is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. 77 This
treaty, effective May 1972, prohibits the emplacement of weapons,
structures, launching installations, storage and testing facilities
upon the seabed and the subsoil in the area "beyond the outer limit
of a seabed zone."78s That area is defined as coterminous with the
twelve-mile outer limit of the contiguous zone provided for in Part
II of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, measured by Part I, Section II (the territorial sea). Since the
73. Creamer and others feel that the ocean, being so expansive, provides sufficient territory for both the freedoms of navigation and fishing
to be freely exercised concurrent with the exploitation of deep sea resources.
74. E.g., see note 47 supra.
75. Margolis, supra note 19.
76. See the Nixon proposal, Section V, infra.
77. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, supra note 19.
78. Id. at Art. I, paragraph 2.

territorial water concept has not been legally hmited, the treaty
could be left virtually ineffective by expansions of those waters
by nonsignatory states. However, such is unlikely to be the case
in view of the general acceptance of a concept of a high seas area
(either the traditional concept of res nullius or the newly favored
concept of res communis), and also in view of the fact that these
major powers made the effort to meet and agree on such limitations. But, the existence of the treaty itself points out the importance of arriving at some definite conclusion on the issues of territorial waters (from which a limit on the contiguous zone would
naturally follow), the continental shelf, and a regime for the high
seas. As seamounts and guyots could provide ideal platforms for
such underwater weapons, the drawing of territorial limits may
keep many of the most accessible mounts from being used for such
purposes.
There is another aspect to the current legal status of the seabed
which is extremely relevant in regard to the forthcoming Geneva
Conference. On December 17, 1970, the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted the Declaration of Principles Governing the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction. 79 While there is great divergence
in views as to the legal force of the Declaration,8 0 its effect seems
to be at least that of a "gentleman's moratorium." An actual mora-

torium on further exploitation of the seabed pending the establishment of an international regime was approved by the General As-

sembly, but was dissented to by the major powers.8 ' The dissents,
plus the fact that the area of the high seas and seabed have not
been limited, greatly detract from the legal forcefulness of the
moratorium. The underlying principle of the Declaration was first
enunciated by Ambassador Pardo of Malta in 1967, as a proposal for
adoption by the General Assembly.82 This proposal has become
79. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970), 10 INTL LEGAL MATERiALs 220 (1971),
adopted by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions.
80. See Brown, The Consequences of Nonagreement, a lecture presented
to the 1973 Conference on TnE LAW OF THE SEA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FAiLURE TO AGREE 1 (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the
Law of the Sea Institute, 1971).
81. G.A. Res. 2574D (XXIV) (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 419, 422
(1970), was adopted by a vote of 62 to 28 with 28 abstentions Dec. 15,
1969. Among the powers voting against the resolution were the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Japan.
82. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967), Examination of the Question of the "Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond
the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind."
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commonly known as the Maltese Item, and its underlying concept
is the "benefit of mankind." In December of 1968, the Assembly
established a permanent committee to explore Ambassador Pardo's
suggestion. 8 What has come to be a generally accepted principle
-the peaceful use of the ocean to benefit mankind-was actually
a new concept and quite a deviation from traditional law of the
seas. As the 1958 Convention on the High Seas illustrates, the un-

derlying theme was freedom of the high seas. Although some "lipservice" was paid to the right of non-coastal states to share in this
freedom, the spirit was generally "first come, first serve." Limitations on this principle were placed only in so far as freedom of
navigation was concerned. The idea that the strongest and most
developed countries should be restrained from full exploitation for
self-interest is certainly a departure from custom. 8 4 Recognition of
the principle by almost all nations indicates a split from the purely
territorial basis of the ocean regime. Whether this concept is one
of legal, moral or political character is left to the negotiations at
the 1973 Conference. 5
In connection with the concept of res communis is the necessity
of organizing machinery for the governing of an international regime which would effectively control exploitation. If the Conference does succeed in this scheme, it would be important that some
specific mention be made of seamounts in order that their relationship to both the international law and the seabed be delineated with precision. Further clarification on the status of artificial
islands is also mandatory in view of the technological possibilties
of building the same in the high seas, possibly atop a seamount or
guyot. The probable consequences of a failure to reach agreement
have fostered several proposals and will be a primary motivating
factor in the 1973 discussions.
83. Permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. G.A. Res. 2467
(XXIII) (1968).

84. It is precisely because this principle has gained acceptance that
the lack of definite limitations to the Territorial Sea and the Continental
Shelf are incongruous and unacceptable now. See Henkin, The General
Assembly and the Sea in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UNID NATIONs
Aim OcEAN MANAGEMvENT 2 (Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference

of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1970).
85. See generally Gorove, The Concept of 'Common Heritage of Mankind': A Political, Moral or Legal Innovation? 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 390

(1972).

V.

PROPOSALS MADE TO DATE

Nearly everyone concerned with the law of the seas has suggested some solution for the existing dilemma.s° The proposals
can be categorized into four major themes, which Francis Christy
has denoted: Wait and See, National Lakes, Flag Nation Regime,
and International Regime. 87 Since no author has yet discussed any
of these theories in view of the special problems presented by seamounts and guyots, they are directed primarily at the seabed in
general, and particularly at the extraction of hard mineral resources. An attempt will be made here to analyze the basic concepts in terms of seamounts, pointing out the weaknesses of the
proposed solutions for a regime of the seabed as a whole.
The Wait and See theory can be summed-up as an acceptance of

the status quo for the time being. Advocates of this course believe
that technology has not yet advanced to a stage where jurisdiction
and ownership of the high seas present a problem. 88 At the same
time they feel that international law, particularly the new concept
of "benefit of mankind," has not been given time to fully develop,
therefore, any agreement arrived at would be premature and probably unworkable after a short time. They deny the feasibility of
working out the problems on a piecemeal basis, holding that all
aspects of oceanic problems (for example, fishing quotas, territorial limits, and territorial claims) are interdependent.8 9 The
Wait and See theorists believe that there is sufficient time to work
out a modification of the Shelf Convention by substituting a fixed
standard for the indefinite exploitability delimitations and to see
what problems actually develop with the law in its present state. 0
This contention is precisely where the weakness of the theory becomes apparent, rather distinctly in light of the possibilities available for seamounts. Technology is presently available for the de86. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/L.10 (1972).
87. Christy, Alternate Regimes for Minerals of the Sea Floor, 1 NAT.
REs. LAW. (No. 2) 63 (1968).
88. Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and
Problems, 3 INT'L LAw. 31 (1969); and Ely, American Policy Options in
the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources, 2 INT'L LAW. 215, 217
(1968) and A Case for the Administration of Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas by National Interests, 1 NAT. REs. LAw. (No. 2) 78
(1968).
89. Cf. authors such as McDougal, Revision of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea-The Views of a Commentator, 1 NAT. RES.
LAw. (No. 3) 19 (1968), and Johnston, supra note 24 who call for functional differentiation of the points of contention and independent solutions for each.
90. See Young, supra note 59.
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velopment of shallow seamounts and guyots-91 The lack of controlling law in the area will result in a land-grabbing contest with
the major powers as predetermined winners, and the landlocked
and developing countries left behind. Exploitation of the deep seabed was merely a wistful vision in 1958-it is a reality today, with
seamounts and other low tide elevations presenting themselves for
use in the very near future. The laws created in 1958 cannot effectively control the plans of today. The failure to take preventative measures can do nothing but present even greater complexities
92
and problems for any agreement in the future.
The second proposal, National Lakes, calls for a division of the
ocean into sectors to be owned by coastal states.93 This theory is
predicated on the supposition that the coastal states have full right
to the enjoyment of the ocean and its resources, similar to the common law riparian rights of real property owners on the shore of -a
lake, that is the rights to, and determined by, a median line. The
underlying rationalization for this suggestion is the coastal states'
need for security, 94 and, a belief that only the coastal states are in a
position to manage and regulate oceanic activities. The faults with
this system are obvious. Land-locked states are entirely excluded
from the opportunity to explore and exploit the resources of the
ocean, thus maintaining the great disparity already in existence.
Likewise, shelf-locked states are severely limited in their right to
participate, while islands would get disproportionate control over
seabed areas. 95 Such inequities will surely multiply when the
ocean becomes widely utilized as a source of minerals and other
resources. 90
The Flag Nation Regime is also a modification of the status quo.
Its major premise is that existing law is adequate to treat most of
the issues that will arise with an expansion of our employment of
91. See note 23, supra.
92. See FAILuRn TO AGREE, infra Sec. VII.
93. See the map created by F. Christy and H. Herfindahl, critics of this
theory, demonstrating the geographical difficulties to be encountered in
dividing the ocean among the coastal states. F. Christy and H. Herfindahl,
A Hypothetical Division of the Sea Floor, reproduced in W. FRIEDmANN,

supra note 9 at 4-5. For the view of an early supporter of the concept
see Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea-Security of Investment,
2 INT'L LAW. 67 (1967) and 1 NAT. REs. LAw. (No. 1) 82 (1968).

94. But see Creamer, supra note 48, at 215.
95. See Newton, supra note 62.
96. See Note, Land-Locked States, supranote 30.

the sea. Followers of this approach advocate that states could occupy the seabed (for purposes of claiming exclusive rights to resources) merely by the link between a surface ship and work being
done on the seabed. Presumably, such occupation would be sufficient for a claim of exclusivity with no limit on duration other than
a fairly continuous use of that area. The types of exploitation that
could be carried on would be restricted only by the existing law of
the seas, that is, by the need to maintain freedom of navigation,
fishing, laying cables, and laws regulating pollution. A Flag Nation approach could be very appealing to developed nations in view
of the accessibility and relative practicability of claiming a seamount. A system of international registration of claims is also embodied in this concept. 97 This proposal, without collateral controls and enforcement, may engender even more conflicts than it
is designed to curb. Developing countries lose out in any race to secure a claim to valuable undersea resources, and land-locked countries would probably fall into the same disadvantage. The major
developed powers might find enough common ground to avoid doing battle, but the concept of res communis is lost. It is of interest
to note that while these nations would undoubtedly profit from an
enaction of this proposal, not one has endorsed it.98 In terms of
seamounts and guyots, an acceptance of this regime would mean
that the major powers would dominate those areas of the seabed
which are most accessible and which would otherwise offer the
most practical bases for deep sea operation to the countries which
are technologically unequipped to venture into the deep sea.
The fourth approach to solving the problems of the high seas calls
for the establishment of an international regime. There are factions within this camp as to just what kind of regime is necessary,
the arguments basically following two lines. The concept of some
type of international regime res communis has become generally
accepted, as evidenced by the "Principles" Resolution.99 The major contention among supporters centers around the proper method
of operation.
97. See discussions in Young, supra note 59, at 648, and Christy, supra
note 87.

See also W. BURKE, TowARwS
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(1969) describing such a registration system for use pending the establishment of an international regime, which proposal won approval at the
Stockholm Symposium, 1968.
98. For an example of U.S. opposition, see Hearings on S. 2801 before

the Subcommittee on Minerals,,Materials, and Fuels of the Committee on

Interior and InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
99. See note 79, supra. See generally, THE LAw OF Tm SEA: A Naw
GENE A CONFERENCE (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the
Law of the Sea Institute, 1971).
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For the most part, advocates of an international regime for the
high seas opt for a landlord-tenant situation under which dominion
of the seabed resources would be vested in some international organization. Under this system, states and private corporations
would acquire leases for the development of defined areas of the
seabed. It has not been made clear whether seamounts and guyots
are included as part of this seabed. If they are impliedly included
by the failure to distinguish any geological characteristics, then
their importance should be manifest. Such an arrangement, the
leasing of defined areas of the seabed, lends itself to immediate
application on seamounts since their territory is definable. If seamounts and guyots are excluded from the seabed proposal, then
the drafters are overlooking what is bound to be a most pressing
problem -due to present technological capabilities; the exclusion
would also serve to defeat the concept of international dominion,
at least in part. Rents and royalties derived from the exploitation
of the seabed would be paid to the international organization, while
the developers would be entitled to draw a profit from their exploitation, thus, preserving the incentive to explore and exploit
the deep seas.
Exactly what type of organization would be set up to manage
and enforce the arrangement is also a point of controversy. Mr.
Young believes that the United Nations is not equipped to handle
such long-term and continual management operations. 0 0° He and
others have suggested an organization developed along the lines of
the World Bank. No matter what differences exist as to the type
of landlord for the job, there is uniform agreement among the followers of this theory, that the returns (rents and royalties) collected should be distributed among the international community,
with special consideration given to the land-locked and developing
nations. 101 Mention is also made of the possible direct distribution
of the resources derived from such exploitations, which would, in
a sense, -directly increase the participation of the recipient states
making it more of an internationally oriented program.
A primary adherent of this policy is the present United States
administration. In a May, 1970, statement by President Nixon on
100. Young, supra note 59 at 650.
101. See Proceedings, supra note 99.

United States oceans policy, an affirmation of the res communis
concept and a willingness to join in an international venture were
underlying themes. 0 2 The President called for national claims to
be limited to a depth of 200 meters (calling back into use the fixed
limit of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf' 08 ) with
the remainder to be considered as high seas, the resources of which
would be the common heritage of mankind. The proposed restriction of 200 meters for national claims implies that seamounts located beyond this boundary would also fall into the international
regime and their exploitation would only occur under the auspices
of an international organization. The use and profits for international distribution is acquiesced to, along with a statement calling
for effective control over pollution and ".

.

. to assure the integrity

of the investment necessary for such exploitation .... ,,104 The departure from the ordinary plan for an international regime is in
the type of machinery suggested for authorizing exploitation.
First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the inter-

national community in an international trusteeship zone consisting
of the continental margins beyond a depth of 200 meters off their
coasts. In return, each coastal State would receive a share of the
international revenues from the zone in which it acts as trustee
and could impose additional taxes if these were deemed desirable.
As a second step, agreed international machinery would authorize
and regulate exploration and use of sea-bed resources beyond the
continental margins. 0 5
There are several interesting factors to be noted here. First, there
is the concept of the continental margin as a trusteeship zone. The
continental margin is not defined by the President, but is presumedly the remainder of the continental shelf (geographically)
after the 200 meter mark. Seamounts in this zone would then be
subject to the control of the coastal state, thus diminishing actual
international participation in their development. What was markedly omitted from the President's proposal is a definition of the type
of trusteeship to be set up. The amount of discretion to be left
with the trustee (the coastal state), and the power to remain with
the "settlor" (the international community) are unstated. President Nixon's proposal was not met with an extremely favorable response, 0 6 most likely because of the obvious attempt to reserve
102. 9 INT'L LEGAL M1ATERIS 806, (1970). The United States Draft of a
United Nations Convention on an International Seabed Area, August 3,
1970, encompasses the same concepts as the Nixon proposal. 9 INT'L LGAL MATERIALS 1046; Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon 1970,
No. 160, p.454.
103. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 1, Art. 1.
104. The Nixon proposal, supra note 102, at 808.
105. Id.

106. See Proceedings, supra note 99.
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so much beneficial control in the coastal states (i.e., the right of the
coastal state to determine who will exploit and the manner and
time of exploitation). A second significant factor, and another
reason for the luke-warm reception of the proposal, is that it is
dependent upon the international acceptance of a 12-mile territorial
sea and free transit through international straits. 10 7 Third, the
President specifically rejected the United Nations approved moratorium on further development of the seabed until agreement is
reached, instead calling for the issuance of permits which would
be subject to any regime accepted at a later date, while at the same
time protecting the integrity of investment made in the interim
period. In connection with this proposal, Senate Bill S. 2801 was
introduced by Senator Metcalf. 0 8 This bill provides for the issuance of permits for deep sea hard mineral resources development,
subject to the adoption of an international regime. 0 9 For purposes here, the importance of Mr. Nixon's proposal is that it would
place many accessible and potentially exploitable areas within
control of the United States, particularly the Hawaiian Ridge seamounts. 110 The exploration of this chain may be forthcoming in
the not too distant future, and the United States is naturally anxious to avoid potential conflict as to jurisdiction and ownership.
The other faction of advocates of an international regime would
like to see the regime be all inclusive, rather than merely act in the
landlord capacity. Most authors have labeled the notion as unrealistic."' The all-inclusive regime would be fully operative; in
other words, it would direct, own and control all the machinery
for developing the seabed. Thus, it would act as a proprietor

rather than a landlord, and would hire states and corporations to
107. This is a fairly obvious attempt to appease the military needs and
desires for extensive submarine freedom of movement. The problems of
dispute on the territorial sea limits are too many for discussion here. For
a good background, see generally TnE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UN= NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEENT (Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Confer-

ence of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1970). See also, Knight, The 1971
United States Proposalson the Breadth of the TerritorialSea and Passage
Through InternationalStraits, 51 OREL L. REV. 759 (1972).
108. S. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
109. See Auburn, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, 9 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 491 (1972).
110. See Craven, supra note 42.
111. E.g., see Young, supra note 59 at 648.

perform the work. The eventual objective of this formula would
be to have an entire agency of the United Nations or some other
international organization composed of seabed experts, including
engineers and businessmen desirous of earning income for the en112
terprise.
Any proposed international regime should be considered with a
sense of urgency in light of the potentially early exploitation of
the seabed, and especially of seamounts and guyots which are so
readily available.
VI. RECOmmENDATIONS
What is -desired, in view of the rapid advances of technology, is a
regime for seamounts and guyots which will prevent their unilateral claim and exploitation by nations to the exclusion of other
nations, and avoid those problems inherent in claiming and occupying unowned territory. A regime for the entire seabed has long
been sought, but the urgency which often fosters such agreements
is lacking because most of the seabed is still economically out of
reach for all practical purposes. Such is not the case with seamounts and guyots. As previously indicated, they are within
reach, and are currently prospects for massive exploitation, and
possibly occupation, by a few developed countries. Accordingly,
a regime governing the status of seamounts is essential now, -and
must be adopted without undue delay. But a regime of this scope
would be very narrow, and would not aid in the formulation of
an international agreement for the seabed as a whole. It must do
this because, as indicated, seamounts are clearly the path technology will follow to full utilization of the ocean bed and its resources. The regime established for seamounts must of necessity,
therefore, be part of an all-inclusive program covering every aspect of the ocean as an area for exploitation and development.
Although many writers disagree on the proper form which an
international regime for the seabed should take, most writers agree
that an operational international monopoly would be clearly unacceptable to most countries.1 13 It may well be argued that only
this type of actively operating organization could best serve the
concept of res communis," 4 which most scholars agree must be the
guiding principle of any international regime dealing with the sea112. See Christy, supra note 87, Young, supra note 59; see also, REcSec. VI, infra.
113. E.g. Young, supra note 59, at 648; but see U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49
(1972).
114. See Gorove, supra note 85.

OMMENDATIONS,
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bed. An operational organization would be best equipped to control the withdrawal of minerals and the exploitation of resources,
and distribute the wealth of the sea floor to the nations of the
world, thus preventing the effective domination of the seabed and
its resources by the developed countries." 5 As a necessary element of being operational, the regime would be income-receiving,
which would insure its independence and continued feasibility.
While some writers argue that the expense of deep sea non-living
resource utilization is prohibitive at this time,11 6 the fact that commercial development is being undertaken is an indication that seabed exploitation is, or very soon will be, profitable to the extent
that it will be a major enterprise." 7 It would be worthwhile to
emphasize here that the goals and maximum efficiency of such an
operation would not be obtained in the near future, or perhaps
even the foreseeable future. Ultimate success will depend on technological advances, international cooperation, and a continually increasing demand for seabed resource utilization, as well as an effective administration for an international organization of this
type. But given the results which can be expected from such an
organization, a lengthy trial period and forgiving membership, the
end result would be an enriched world community, economically,

politically, and morally, drawn together through international exploitation of an as yet undeveloped asset of the globe.
The initial step in the creation of a regime of this nature would
be the clain by an internationally created organization" 8 of a
115. The theory of an international leasing organization would accom-

plish this to a limited extent. However, should the organization attempt
to withhold certain areas of the seabed as a reserve for the developing
countries, the result would be a waste of resources; and, in all probability,
the application of pressure by the exploiting countries for the organization to open up these prime areas for exploitation would follow. The
practical result in the long run would probably be domination of the
seabed by the developed countries.

116. See W. FRIEDMA

,

supranote 9, and Schaefer, supra note 25.

117. See note 23, supra.
118. The United Nations might be a likely candidate in which to vest
title to the seabed, were it not for the strenuous opposition which this
idea has received. E.g., see Burke, A Negative View of a Proposal for
United Nations Ownership of Ocean Mineral Resources, 1 NAT. RES. LAW.
(No. 2) 46 (1968); also the objections of the United States and the Soviet
Union that they were opposed to the idea of the United Nations having an
independent source of income. Accordingly, the international organization
referred to will be designated the International Oceans Agency (IOA) and

vested right to all territory outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal states, and all non-living resources of the high seabed for
the benefit of mankind. The title claimed would not encompass the
area of the "legal" continental shelf (that is, the area adjacent to
the coast which, under the regime, would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state), the living resources of the
oceans, nor the water of the high seas. The legal status of these
separate elements would be subject to international treaties 1n and
customary international law, including such concepts as freedom
20

of the seas.1

A. Removable Marine Resources
The first employment which will be of interest will be the exploration for and exploitation of extractable mineral resources. As
mentioned, seamounts will play an important part in this enterprise, and when vast sums are allocated for the retrieval of minerals from a certain area, 121 it is very possible that conflicts could
arise between competing interests. Procedures must be established
for seamounts to prevent such conflicts from occurring and which
will be equally effective for the capitalization of the sea floor. A
regime which treats the two areas independently, or the total absence of any regulation of seamounts, will cause even further problems than are currently foreseeable.
Two possibilities would be open to the I.O.A. at this stage with
the goal of producing revenues for regional or international deit will be considered as an independent international creation, estab-

lished through international agreement for the control of the seabed.
119. Obviously, international agreement in the undertaking of such a
venture is fundamental, and the program would be impossible without the
consent and support of the developed nations and major powers. Another essential element is the establishment of a uniform territorial water
limit for all coastal states. While depth and exploitability are currently
criteria, and a combination of depth and lateral distance has received
support, any solution that is workable and uniform would be adequate.
In any event, unilateral encroachment into the high seas would be totally
antithetical to the concept of an international regime.
120. Other rules which have been established for the oceans include
those relating to pollution and radiation. Any major installation on the
high seas would have to solve its waste disposal problems without violating regulations covering pollution. Similarly, any installation which
might utilize atomic power would be subject to international provisions
relating to radiation contamination of the high sea.
121. One estimate predicts the capital cost of an efficient production
unit processing about 1 million tons of manganese nodules per year is
$180 million, which would not include any of the costs incident to development of equipment for retrieval, and extraction. Committee of the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limit of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SCI (1971).
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velopment banks or agencies: contracting with the developed nations (or private firms thereof) or long term leasing of desirable
ocean areas. The former would put the I.O.A. in the position of
the developer, soliciting bids from nations or private firms capable
of doing the necessary undersea exploration and exploitation, for
the right to remove mineral resources from the seabed. Those
bidding for the right would have to pay royalties to the I.O.A.,
while retaining sufficient profits from the undertaking to make the
endeavor worthwhile. Furthermore, reasonable incentives would
encourage the technological developments necessary to make such
operations more profitable in the future. The I.O.A. would receive
proceeds from the exploitation of these harvested resources, or,
where desired, the fees could be paid in kind from the minerals
retrieved. The right to process materials retrieved might also be
let out on a contractual basis, until such time as it became economically advantageous for the processing to be done internally.
Fees could be paid out in monetary form and transferred to international banks and treasuries; or the finished elements could be
transferred to nations in need which were incapable of ,acquiring

the resources on the open market.

Technological development

would be encouraged by a program of this nature, in that the nation or firm with the ability to retrieve or process the minerals at
the lowest cost would be awarded the contracts. And, the greater
the proceeds accruing to the contracting party, the more funds
would be available for research and development. Likewise, the
proceeds to the I.O.A. would be greater. Under this system, the less
advanced nations who were interested in ocean research would not
be precluded, for they could secure the right to exploit the shallower
areas of the ocean as they developed the technological capability, while the nations with ability to extract minerals from greater
depths could be set to the task of harvesting the yield from the deep
sea floor.
Long term leases of undersea areas present another possibility,
which is perhaps more feasible at this time. Nations or private
enterprises could bid for leases of submerged lands considered ripe
for exploitation, leases being granted in return for a portion of the
value of the extracted minerals. The nation or firm doing the exploitation would retain sufficient profit to recognize a suitable return on investment and permit further development, while the in-

ternational community would receive funds or the minerals themselves. The granting of leases should also avoid the possibility of
conflict from competing interests, as the lessee would have sovereignty over the area leased, subject only to I.O.A. 'control. A sufficiently long term lease on a rich area would foster the development of sophisticated equipment and techniques for mineral retrieval, but would have the disadvantage of precluding some nations whose technological capability was inadequate to secure
leases. The developed nations would undoubtedly lease the shallower areas for the initial phase of the development, thus precluding the participation of nations which might become capable of limited undersea mining operations within the period of the leases.
Considering the vast area involved, however, the problem does not
appear insurmountable.
Under either of these systems, funds would become available to
the I.O.A. which could be applied to the ultimate goal of construction and operation of an independent resource utilization program,
entirely owned and operated by the international community. Consideration for leases or contractual rights might take any form, including monetary return, minerals in raw or processed form, or
even the delivery of equipment or scientific know-how to the U.N.
in exchange for the right to operate for certain periods and recover profit sufficient to permit continued participation. In time,
the I.O.A. could be the owner of fleets, installations, and processing

plants through which operations would be conducted. Funds resulting from the -development would permit the organization to go

to national and private organizations for the creation of needed
equipment or technological capability, much as the governments of
the world do now. The industry which has grown up around the
concept of deep-sea utilization would thus not be eclipsed by the
vesting of title in an international ocean agency.
Once the entire enterprise attained some degree of efficiency, the
minerals of the seabed would be readily available to the world market. Proceeds from sale might be reinvested in various phases of
the operation, while resources needed by developing nations could
be delivered to them through international machinery. Contributions to this international undertaking could be made by all nations, developed or otherwise, in the form of scientific research,
equipment, or manpower.
B.

Non-Removable Marine Resources

In addition to the minerals resources of the seabed, there are the
non-removable resources of the ocean. Here seamounts play an
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important part, because of the possible uses to which they may be
put. As with the removable resources, problems will arise if no
regime is established for seamounts before full scale utilization is
underway, or if a regime covering seamounts and guyots alone is
established which later conflicts with a regime for the deep seabed.
Most of the uses for seamounts which involve completely underwater operations may, sometime in the future, be carried out on the
abyssal plain. To make a set of regulations governing seamounts
now, which is not a part of an overall scheme for the seabed, will
preserve the seamounts for the public good, but may well accelerate the race to the sea floor. A system which acknowledges and
provides for both these areas while they are still unexploited to
any great degree will insure healthy and beneficial development of
the ocean's non-removable resources.
With title to all non-territorial submerged territory vested in
the I.O.A., permission would have to be sought and obtained before a project could be undertaken. Leasing of certain areas for the
completion of these projects would be the logical result of such requests, with the cost of the lease to be determined by the nature of
the enterprise anticipated. Profit-producing installations, such as
surface and subsea ports, fixed fishing installations, 122 communications systems, privately owned resorts and hotels, and others
would call for the payment of rents, while LORAN stations or
research bases operated for the benefit of the world community
would be entitled to nominal rents or free utilization altogether.
Again, the nature of the regime is ownership of the ocean's resources by the U.N., specifically for the receipt of income, with provisions for nations or private firms to exploit resources under the
authority of, and subject to the mandates of the international control organization.
One problem area is that involving uses by nations which are
neither entirely profit making, not entirely for the benefit of the
world community. An example would be a weather forecasting
(and control) station constructed by a nation on the high seas off
its coasts, to forecast (and control) the weather that would affect
its territory. Such enterprises would be categorized by their ef122. It would be the fishing installation, and not the fish extracted
which would be subject to control.

feet. If only the constructing nation was benefitted, even though its
motive was not a profit making one, it would then be subjected to
the payment of rents; if the station benefited other nations as
well, the use might be considered sufficiently international in scope
to warrant free use of the ocean resource. In any event, each utilization will have to be evaluated in terms of its purpose and ultimate effect on the land masses and the sea itself.
Another area of possible conflict would involve safety installations, such as LORAN stations, which are constructed by one nation, but benefit others as well. There is no reason why the country which constructs the installation should have to pay for the
right to utilize an ocean resource; likewise, there is no reason why
the I.O.A. could not carry out such projects itself, manning them
with international personnel. 128 However until such time as this is
feasible, there would be no need to reimburse any nation for a unilateral expenditure of this type. The installations are currently
being built with no thought of future repayment by the world community. Such advantageous projects should be entitled to operate without charge, whether individual nations continued to man
them, or their control was turned over to the international regime.
The operation of offshore installations by international, rather
than national, personnel would alleviate many of the security fears
which are voiced by coastal states when the concept of such constructions is presented. A nation should not fear the presence of
any offshore enterprise conducted by an international agency with
no interest in the coastal state's military capability or security.
To dispel further fears, however, preference should be given to
coastal states, or their allies, in the initial stages of the international organization's mining operations. Care should be taken to
avoid permitting the utilization of a fixed resource by one nation
near the coast of an historical enemy. These are subjects for negotiation, but it would seem that they would be likely resolved if
an international regime of the scope suggested here were ever created.
All of the revenues accruing from the initial operation of this organization should be earmarked for further seabed development for
the benefit of the world community. Once an independent source
of income was established for the international community, funds
would be made available for underdeveloped countries, not merely
123. Projects similar to this are already underway under the auspices of
the United Nations. A good example is the World Meteorological Organization (W.M.O.) which was set up through the U.N. to establish
weather stations and conduct weather research all over the world.

[voL. 10: 599, 1973]

Seamounts and Guyots
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

in times of crisis, as is currently the case, but for long range development in all areas. The increase in the availability of minerals on
the world market would lower the prices, and permit countries
which might otherwise be excluded from world markets to participate.124 Land-locked nations might be afforded an opportunity
to utilize ocean resources through installations on the high seas,
funded through I.O.A. contribution, and repayable from the profits
accruing to the constructing nation. The long range forecast for
an operation of this type is that, while it must be immense because
of the vast area involved, 125 it could be successful, and once operational, should justify the difficulties in formation, and reward the
nations of the world for participation in an international venture.
VII. FAILURE TO AGREE

The failure to formalize a concrete agreement reflecting the spirit
of -rescommunis for the seabed will leave the area virtually uncontrolled except for the traditional limits of the law of the sea (freedoms of navigation and fishing, etc.). The result would be that
the doctrine of res nullius continues in operation, thus permitting
"....

portions of the seabed to be appropriated and exclusive na-

tional claims to be extended even to the open seas-particularly
1 26
the sea shallows and seamounts scattered throughout the ocean."'
That this result would be acceptable to very few is apparent from
the numerous proposals which have been made to avoid it, and
from the general attitude which has developed since the introduction of the Maltese Item in 1968.
Some authors have proposed that there need be no sense of urgency in the development of a solution to the problems of the seabed. 127 This paper has attempted to demonstrate that a failure to
124. Schaefer, supra note 23, makes the point that development of the
ocean's resources rather than land based reserves of the same minerals
might well hinder the development of the disadvantaged nations. The
basis of this belief is the fact that a substantial portion of the world's
needs for the resources available from the seabed is supplied by the developing nations, and many of the resources are also plentiful in the same
nations. Accordingly, full scale exploitation of undersea resources would
be competing with these developing nations for a share of the world market.
125. The area of the ocean floor is estimated at 140 million square miles.
126. FRamANA, supranote 9, at 48.
127. See note 88, supra.

agree in 1973, or at some time within the near future, would farther complicate the-problems, hinder development of the resources,
and constructively prevent the land-locked, shelf-locked and developing nations from obtaining a share in the newly found wealth.
The oversight of the special nature of seamounts and guyots has led
to this misconception. These formations, particularly the low tide
elevations, present potential for exploitation in the near future, and
are the next step to the deep seabed. Predictions as to the consequences of a failure to agree in 1973 vary, as do the predictions of
the likelihood that agreement will be reached, 128 but the far-reaching consequences must be kept in the forefront of the minds of the
negotiators.
Existing problems will be further complicated as a natural result of an ability to exploit and the actual exploitation of the seabed when coupled with a vacuum of international law. The developed countries which can take advantage of technological advances will have a vested interest in the areas which they exploit.
The consensus of opinion is that fairly massive exploitation will be
required in order to realize a profit. Once countries and corporations have expended vast amounts exploring the seabeds and setting up the necessary equipment for exploitation, the desire to
share the outcome will be minimized. Full cooperation will never
again be so available as it is at the present time when no one has
yet a great vested interest in the seabed. Another aspect of this
same problem is that at the present time, although scientific speculation has been made as to the abundance of wealth to be found
in the seabed, including the availability of seamounts and guyots
for other than mineral exploitation, no truly accurate determination of the real potential of the area is possible. If and when the
facts become known, the stakes may rise and national self-interest
in accumulation could predominate.
At the present time, development of technology for exploring and
exploiting the depths of the high seas is underway. Concern has
already been shown for the security of investments in the area.120
Once the exploration point is past, developers will necessarily be
wary of investing further and hesitant to emplace expensive equipment on the sea floor if the danger exists that the same may be
appropriated by an international regime. Agreement for the international machinery, one that assures a fair profit to those who would
exploit, can only serve as incentive for the further development of
the seabed. Conversely, substantial investments made under the
128. See Proceedings, supra note 99.
129. See note 98, supra.
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present, manifestly inadequate, law of the seas will serve to pressure
the governments of developed nations into accepting a stance inimical to the concepts underlying res commnunis. As only the major developed countries have the immediate ability to venture into this
frontier by way of seamounts and guyots, and since the expenditure of vast amounts will result in the acquisition of vested interests in the seabed, there may be little left of value by the time the
less developed and land-locked states are able to enter the race.
Such a result will surely increase the frustrations of these excluded nations, in turn increasing the tensions in the international
arena. The concept of res communis will be defeated, and any
idealistic hopes for the benefit of mankind will also be crushed.

The laissez-faire exploitation of the ocean floor will continue to
help the "rich get richer ....
" The international community will
lose out, not only because of added tensions, but because by refusing to cooperate and share in the efforts of exploitation, the job
will not be performed with the greatest possible efficiency.
Seamounts and guyots present the possibility of exploitation of
the seabed in the near future. This special feature should not be
overlooked when negotiating an international regime for the seabed. Awareness of the immediacy of the problem and the consequences at stake should bring a new sense of urgency to the debate. Although these geological structures present a unique picture for the present, it must be remembered that they are merely
a part of the seabed which is more accessible today. An attempt to
deal with seamounts as a separate problem would be unrealistic,
and would fail to achieve any purpose. Any international agreement which is arrived at should specifically include these structures as part of the seabed, yet still provide for the unique uses
to which they lend themselves. The problems associated with seamounts and guyots are part of the "deeper" problem of the seabed,
but part of a problem that must be faced today.
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